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Executive Summary:

The St. Louis Region’s Public
Health Response to COVID-19
Spring 2022

The Public Health Response to COVID-19 in the St. Louis
Region of Missouri is one of three regional reports that
offers findings from conversations with local stakeholders
and residents about their experience with the state and
region’s pandemic response. The study focused on the
period from March 2020 through May 2021, just prior
to the surge caused by the delta variant and well before
the emergence of the omicron variant. Its aim is to
document efforts by the St. Louis region’s local public
health agencies (LPHAs) and a multitude of other stakeholders to combat COVID-19, and to identify lessons
that could strengthen public health practices to better
safeguard communities in the future.
Missouri’s approach to public health is decentralized, and
as such LPHAs were tasked with tapping local, regional,
and state relationships and resources to wage a locally
tailored response to a global virus. Uneven resources
and a varied approach challenged pandemic response
coordination, both regionally and across the state, despite
enormous dedication by local public health; state and
local elected officials; health care organizations; first
responders; community non-profits; and countless others.
The four LPHAs in the St. Louis region of Missouri profiled
in this report — those of the City of St. Louis, Jefferson
County, St. Charles County, and St. Louis County — have
been chronically underfunded compared to health
departments in other states. Years of disinvestment

and negligible state contributions to LPHAs took an
enormous toll on staff, operations, and all other aspects
of LPHAs’ response to the COVID-19 pandemic. LPHAs
relied heavily on external funding to meet the resource
demands of the pandemic. Despite all four LPHAs
receiving Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act funding, they did not ultimately have
sufficient financial support to alleviate strain on public
health departments. LPHAs were challenged to muster
a robust pandemic response and maintain traditional
public health programs designed to help those most
in need in their communities.
Our hope is that the following key study findings will
be leveraged for the purpose of strengthening the state
public health system’s ability to continue to respond to
the COVID-19 pandemic and to face future crises with
greater resources, coordination, equitable strategies,
modernized infrastructure, and public trust. Because
Missouri is a large and diverse state, we also acknowledge there is no single pandemic story. Experiences and
events of the crisis — including the speed of the virus’s
spread, how infection impacted populations, and how
local authorities and stakeholders responded — differed
from region to region.
Readers may also be interested in the companion reports,
The Public Health Response to COVID-19 in the Northeast Region of Missouri1 and The Public Health Response

1 Trott, J., Mead, K., Markus, A., Acosta, A., Baños, J., Conway, C., Benoit, M., and Regenstein, M. “The Public Health Response to
COVID-19 in the Northeast Region of Missouri” (2022). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.
edu/sphhs_policy_missouri/
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to COVID-19 in the Southwest Region of Missouri.2
Findings from the three reports were used to inform the
state-level recommendations in our report Missouri’s
Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key Findings
and Recommendations for State Action and Investment,

which was developed for the purpose of strengthening
the state public health system’s ability to face future crises,
and to capitalize on new and timely federal funding
opportunities in the wake of the pandemic.3

2 Trott, J., Mead, K., Benoit, M., Hughes, D., Levi, J., Baños, J., Seyoum, S., and Regenstein, M. “The Public Health Response to
COVID-19 in the Southwest Region of Missouri” (2022). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.
edu/sphhs_policy_missouri/
3 Levi, J., Regenstein, M., Hughes, D., Trott, J., Markus, A., Seyoum, S., Acosta, A., Benoit, M., Van Bronkhorst, H., Conway, C.
“Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key Findings and Recommendations for State Action and Investment”.
(September 2021). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. Paper 61. https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_briefs/61

KEY FINDINGS: ST. LOUIS REGION OF MISSOURI’S PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO COVID-19

Key Finding

A

Years of Emergency
Response and
Preparedness
Experience Were an
Asset in the Early
Response of the
Pandemic

Summary
Though COVID-19 descended first in Missouri in the greater St. Louis area, LPHAs had been
planning weeks before its arrival, mobilizing emergency response staff in their agencies and
other employees who were cross-trained to work as emergency responders. For some LPHAs
and health care organizations, prior experience with public health emergencies, including
H1N1 and flu outbreaks helped to facilitate pandemic response efforts. Nevertheless,
stakeholders across sectors did not feel prepared for the magnitude and scope of the
pandemic, and LPHAs found their substantial planning efforts to be insufficient in the face of
years of underinvestment in public health infrastructure by the state.
Stakeholders and residents felt that the region would have benefited from more coordinated
leadership from the state.

B

LPHA Staffing
and Resource
Constraints
Profoundly Limited
the Response

Even with experienced leadership and staff, LPHAs were not equipped with sufficient resources,
capacity, and modernized technology to address the formidable challenges presented by
the pandemic. LPHAs had trouble keeping up with the needs of their communities and were
overwhelmed with pandemic-related activities such as contact tracing. CARES Act dollars
created opportunities to staff up for these activities, but came too late for some LPHAs and did
not strengthen overall public health capacity.

C

Community
Partnerships
Enhanced the
Pandemic Response,
But Revealed
Substantial Limits
in Public Health
Capacity

The arrival of COVID-19 sparked an unprecedented level of collaboration and partnership that
stakeholders described as rare for sectors in the St. Louis region. The four LPHAs communicated
frequently as they navigated stages of the pandemic, despite political differences and different
mitigation approaches across the region. Deficiencies in LPHA capacity and infrastructure led
to the creation of the St. Louis Metropolitan Pandemic Task Force, a unique partnership among
the four major health systems. Federally qualified health centers also assumed a larger role in
public health activities and served as major service points for testing and vaccinations for their
communities. New partnerships (the Regional Response Team and PrepareSTL) were formed to
address social and economic needs of local residents.
LPHAs were involved in multiple cross-sector partnerships, but were not viewed by stakeholders
as having the capacity to lead the regional response. Stakeholders and residents appreciated the
strong leadership and clear messaging from Task Force Incident Commander Dr. Alex Garza, but
underscored the need for broader representation on the Task Force, especially from people and
organizations with experience working with Black and Brown communities.

The Public Health Response to COVID-19 in the St. Louis Region of Missouri
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D

Poor Coordination
Between the State
and Local Levels
Weakened the
Region’s Response

The state’s home-rule approach led to poor coordination across jurisdictions and disagreements
over which entity had the final authority to make and enforce pandemic policy. Policies
around school reopening, quarantines, business closures, and masking were highlighted by
stakeholders and residents as examples that varied from county to county, which added to
the overall confusion and a patchwork response. They also noted that a poorly coordinated
response was not wise given the nature of an airborne disease.
Stakeholders and residents considered the vaccine rollout to be inequitable, with rural areas
getting a disproportionate share before the more populated St. Louis region. North St. Louis
was considered by several stakeholders to be a vaccine desert. Black focus group participants
were frustrated with vaccine distribution, which appeared to indicate a lack of concern from
the government about disproportionate impacts of COVID-19 on Black residents.

E

F

G

H
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Inconsistent
Data Reporting
and Outdated IT
Systems Stymied a
Timely and Targeted
Response

LPHA and state data systems were not aligned or up-to-date. Systems of varying sophistication
were used locally to track cases, testing, and vaccines. Discrepancies in state and local data,
driven by inconsistent reporting methods and systems, and delays, undermined trust in
the data among some residents. New case tracking and vaccine registration systems were
introduced by the state late.

Trusted Information
Sources Enhanced
Communication
Efforts But
Contended with
Misinformation
and Inconsistent
Messaging

Significant efforts were made to tailor and target public health messaging to communities in the
St. Louis region. In spite of the various strategies employed by public health, health care, and
community-based organizations to convey accurate and up-to-date information, inconsistent
guidance and misinformation confused residents and undermined public health strategies.

Racial Inequities
Were Not Effectively
Anticipated and
Addressed by
the Local and
State Response,
with Tragic
Consequences

The Public Health
Response Did Not
Sufficiently Meet the
Needs of People
Living in Poverty

Data reporting by race and ethnicity in the region identified disparities in outcomes and enabled
targeted pandemic services, such as testing, to be detected early on. However, some stakeholders
felt that the collection and use of data by race and ethnicity could have been more consistent and
better utilized for response purposes, including to target vaccination outreach.

A majority of focus group residents trusted their public health departments and medical experts
in the community, yet several residents outside of St. Louis City and County felt that their leaders
did not have as strong messaging as the Task Force. Many stakeholders noted a need for direct
interaction with the community via trusted messengers, particularly among individuals who
experienced mistrust or were difficult to reach with traditional modes of communication.
Following a familiar pattern in the St. Louis region, COVID-19 disproportionately impacted Black
and Brown communities, who were subject to greater health and economic consequences, and
inequitable access to testing and vaccines. The considerable expertise across sectors within
St. Louis City and County was not adequately leveraged to create equitable action strategies.
Missed opportunities to build the infrastructure for equity, including investing in data analysis
by race/ethnicity and building upon trusted communication channels within the community,
perpetuated predictable outcomes and mistrust in health care and government agencies.
A number of focus group residents reported that community- and faith-based organizations
were filling the void, reaching out to the most vulnerable and needy residents in the region,
including Black, Brown, immigrant and non-English-speaking groups. Focus group participants
identifying as racial or ethnic minorities noted the high cost and limited availability of tests in their
neighborhoods. Many Black residents experienced racism and discrimination within the context
of the pandemic. The pandemic exacerbated language and cultural barriers that hindered access
to pandemic-related services, like vaccines, for people with limited English proficiency.
The pandemic created employment instability and eroded the ability to access food, housing, and
transportation. Without these basic services, people living in poverty and in under-resourced
communities faced greater difficulty accessing essential public health services like testing, vaccines,
and PPE. Barriers caused by a lack of internet access and other technology affected access to
vaccine appointments, testing and health services. While LPHAs, community organizations, and
other sectors tried to address challenges related to accessing essential services, their efforts fell
short of addressing the root causes of these issues.

The Public Health Response to COVID-19 in the St. Louis Region of Missouri

Study Approach
and Methods
In summer 2020, Missouri Foundation for Health contracted with The George
Washington University Milken Institute School of Public Health to assess Missouri’s public health preparedness and response capacities to the COVID-19
pandemic and future public health crises. The purpose of the regional case
studies is to 1) document the multi-level and multi-stakeholder efforts to combat
COVID-19, and 2) identify lessons from the pandemic that could strengthen
public health practices to better safeguard communities in the future.
In the St. Louis region, which is designated Region C4 by Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services (DHSS) (Figure 2), we spoke candidly
with 40 professional stakeholders in various counties and towns (see the
types of stakeholders we interviewed in Appendix A, Table A). Our sample
included stakeholders within and outside the field of public health, including
schools, health care, the business community, faith-based groups, policymakers, and social service organizations. Our interviews began in October 2020
and concluded in May 2021, prior to the surge caused by the delta variant.
We promised confidentiality and anonymity to study participants to encourage candor when recounting their perspectives and professional experiences.
We refer to this group throughout the report as stakeholders.
We also conducted 11 focus groups and four one-on-one interviews with
people living in the St. Louis region to examine perceptions of the public health
response. We refer to this group throughout the report as residents or focus
group participants. We spoke with a total of 50 participants during spring 2021.
To delve into how the pandemic uniquely impacted people of color, we held
four groups with Black residents (a total of 28 participants). Table B in Appendix
A provides information on the characteristics of the focus group participants.
One limitation of our study is that our sample of residents consisted of individuals who were well-informed about and interested in discussing the St. Louis
region’s response to COVID-19. They were also generally supportive of public
health’s role in helping to stop the spread of the virus. As such, they provided
thoughtful and reasoned input on the public health response in Missouri;
however, we acknowledge that our sample does not represent large groups
of residents who favored a limited role for public health and other government
organizations with respect to the COVID-19 response.
Our interviews with stakeholders and focus group discussions with residents
were supplemented by media accounts and other publicly available data sources.
For more information on the study methodology see Appendix A.

4 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services divides its health reporting regions
according to the Missouri State Highway Patrol map. To view the regional map, see
https://health.mo.gov/data/gis/pdf/map_ReportingRegions.pdf.

How the COVID-19 Pandemic
Unfolded in the St. Louis
Region of Missouri
March 2020 – May 2021

There was a really large community-wide shigella outbreak in a lot of daycares …
My understanding was that [that outbreak] was an all-hands-on-deck situation.
But looking back on it, the people who worked on that have said, ‘My goodness,
we thought that was an all-hands-on-deck?
– PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

As context to understanding the COVID-19 response in
the St. Louis region of Missouri, it is important to first
paint a picture of how the virus impacted the region
and its residents over the time of the case study, March
2020 through May 2021.
Missouri’s first case of COVID-19 occurred in St. Louis
County on March 7, 2020.5 Knowing that more cases
were certain to follow, the St. Louis region had to react
decisively (Figure 2). LPHAs, hospital systems, health
care providers, community organizations, and other

sectors activated new partnerships and opened lines of
communication across existing collaborations to control
the spread of the virus, protect residents, and provide
services and resources to their communities.
Local authorities in St. Louis City, St. Louis County, and
St. Charles County quickly implemented restrictions on
indoor gatherings and closed schools and businesses
in March 20206 and Jefferson County implemented
restrictions in late April 2020.7 Within a matter of weeks,
COVID-19 cases were recorded in all four jurisdictions

5 Missouri Governor Michael L. Parson. Governor Parson, state, and local officials confirm first case of COVID-19 to test “presumptive positive” in Missouri. (2020, March 7). https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-parson-state-and-local-officials-confirm-first-case-covid-19-test
6 City of St. Louis Department of Health. (2020, March 15). Joint statement on COVID-19 from five regional leaders of bi-state government. https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/health/news/joint-statement-regional-leaders-covid-19.cfm
7 Jefferson County Health Center. Board of Trustees Order Number 20-04-28-01. (2020, April 28). https://www.jeffcomo.org/DocumentCenter/View/10068/20-0307-COVID-19-Joint-Reopen-Order?bidId=
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FIGURE 1. WEEKLY AND CUMULATIVE COVID-19 CASES FOR ST. LOUIS MISSOURI,
MARCH 2020 – NOVEMBER 2021
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This graph represents weekly and cumulative PCR confirmed COVID-19 cases for all counties and St. Louis City in Highway
Patrol Region C. The four areas profiled in this report (City of St. Louis, Jefferson County, St. Charles County, and St. Louis
County) make up 85% of Region C’s total population.
SOURCE: Missouri Hospital Association analysis of MO DHSS EpiTrax data, Mar. 10, 2020 – Nov. 30, 2021.

with the number of cases growing to over 1,000 within
the first month of the pandemic. The region’s health
systems readied their facilities and staff for high numbers
of COVID-19 inpatients, and several hospitals opened
testing sites across the region.8 As the number of hospitalizations and deaths grew,9 St. Louis County constructed
a makeshift morgue to prepare for the worst.10

From the moment the pandemic reached the region,
people of color experienced higher case numbers, hospitalizations, and deaths relative to their share of the
population. The Missouri Hospital Association (MHA)
issued a report in April 2020 about COVID-19’s disproportionate impact on Black residents in the region. ZIP
codes with majority Black residents experienced COVID19 case rates twice as high as ZIP codes with majority
White residents.11 Early deaths were almost exclusively

8 SLM Staff. (2020, March 17). SSM Health to open five coronavirus testing sites across the St. Louis region. St. Louis Magazine.
https://www.stlmag.com/health/news/testing-sites-coronavirus-ssm-health-st-louis-covid-19/
9 Clancy, S. (2020, March 30). A timeline of coronavirus in Missouri. KSDK. https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/
coronavirus-timeline-missouri/63-98439849-3152-4f54-80d0-43fe6f50f01e
10 Kohler, J. & Cohen, R. (2020, April 14). St. Louis County builds temporary morgue to house bodies of COVID-19 victims. St. Louis
Post-Dispatch. https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/coronavirus/st-louis-county-builds-temporary-morgue-to-housebodies-of-covid-19-victims/article_4975767c-504b-59fa-aac8-bf3d97b180a2.html
11 Reidhead, M., Johnson-Javois, B., Brown, A., Brinkmann, J., Joynt Maddox, K.E., McBride, T., Porth, L., Long, P., McDowell, V.,
Stoermer, A., Schmidt, S., Echols, F., Purnell, J., Ross, W. (2020). The Disproportionate Impact of COVID-19 on Black and African
American Communities in the St. Louis Region. Available at https://bit.ly/COVID19_STL
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concentrated among Black people, and early cases were
much higher among Black children compared to White
children.12 The St. Louis area has been described as an
“epicenter of civil rights,” after protests followed the 2014
killing of Michael Brown, a Black teenager, by a White
police officer in Ferguson, Missouri.13 The dual epidemics
of systemic racism and COVID-19 contributed to the
inequities in health outcomes documented throughout
the pandemic in the St. Louis region.
With high rates of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths
in the spring, officials in St. Louis County and the City
of St. Louis were concerned that relaxing safety measures would put the public at further risk. In May 2020,
days before Governor Parson’s statewide stay-at-home
order was lifted,14 the City and County implemented
local stay-at-home orders that were more restrictive
than the State’s reopening plan.15 Attempts to slow the
transmission and community spread of COVID-19 led St.
Louis City and County to implement a mask mandate in

early July of 2020.16 Citing enforcement challenges, St.
Charles County did not require residents to wear masks,
but instead encouraged businesses to make masks
mandatory for patrons.17 Jefferson County implemented
an emergency order that required masks to be worn
where social distancing could not be maintained, but
that order was later overturned.18 By late summer, cases
surged to new peaks in all four areas. St. Louis County
broke its record for most single-day case increases three
days in a row.19 This led the St. Louis County and City to
implement new restrictions, including setting limitations
on building capacity, curfews for bars, and requiring
quarantine plans for teachers.20
As these new restrictions went into effect, the region’s
schools were preparing for a new academic year. Teachers and concerned residents protested school reopening
plans as several school districts announced plans to
return to in-person operations, while others would conduct classes fully online or offer hybrid instruction. 21

12 Rivas, R. (2020, May 27). COVID-19 hitting area black children, youth harder than whites. The St. Louis American.
http://www.stlamerican.com/news/local_news/covid-19-hitting-area-black-children-youth-harder-than-whites/article_10f83ebe-a045-11ea-a65d-bb555165bc8a.html
13 The New York Times Staff. (2015, August 10). What happened in Ferguson? The New York Times. https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/13/us/ferguson-missouri-town-under-siege-after-police-shooting.html
14 Missouri Governor Michael L. Parson. Extension stay at home order COVID-19. (2020, April 16). https://governor.mo.gov/press-releases/archive/governor-parson-extends-statewide-stay-home-missouri-order-through-may-3
15 The City of St. Louis. (2020, April 30). City of St. Louis remains under stay at home order beyond May 4th Missouri statewide
reopening. https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/health/news/city-remains-stay-at-home-order-beyond-statemissouri-reopening.cfm
16 The City of St. Louis. St. Louis County, City mandatory mask requirement to slow spread of COVID-19. (2020, July 1).
https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/mayor/news/city-and-county-require-mandatory-masks.cfm
17 Cole, A. (2020, July 27). St. Charles County leaders plea to local businesses: require masks. KSDK. https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/st-charles-county-leaders-plea-to-local-businesses-require-masks/63-01269d4a-a95e-48b9-aae04f83cee5a9ff
18 Jefferson County Health Center. Board of Trustees Order Number 20-08-27-01. (2020, August 27). https://static1.squarespace.
com/static/57f035cc9f745646c52342b9/t/5f494e456c4b253182f16243/1598639686994/Board+of+Trustees+Order+Number+20-08-27-01.pdf
19 Olmos, D. (2020, July 24). St. Louis County reports record number of new COVID-19 cases for 3rd day in a row. KSDK.
https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/coronavirus-numbers/st-louis-county-coronavirus-record-numbers-casestrends/63-98265655-db3a-4c15-afd7-dac82ceab7d1
20 City of St. Louis. Health Commissioner’s Order No. 15. (2020, November 12). https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/health/communicable-disease/covid-19/orders/health-commissioner-order-15.cfm
21 Bernhard, B. (2020, July 20). School reopening plans across St. Louis area vary from all in-person to all online. St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
https://www.stltoday.com/news/local/education/school-reopening-plans-across-st-louis-area-vary-from-all-in-person-to-all-online/
article_b5d61576-8094-5dde-92b7-a5221c838a5b.html

10

The Public Health Response to COVID-19 in the St. Louis Region of Missouri

St. Louis County’s and the City of St. Louis’s health
departments would, among other measures, require
masks to be worn in schools.22,23 As people returned to
work and school and continued moving between the four
areas, the virus spread rapidly throughout the region.
Fall and winter 2020 were particularly challenging for
LPHAs as cases, hospitalizations, and deaths reached
all-time highs. Hospitals were at or near capacity, and
leaders in the area called for state-wide measures to
slow the virus’s spread.24 The region was averaging about
3,000 new weekly cases and hundreds of COVID-19
hospitalizations.25 St. Louis City tightened restrictions,
citing a continued surge of cases, with several hospitals
reaching 90% capacity.26 As a result of high case rates,
Jefferson County implemented a mask mandate to control community transmission.27
Vaccines arrived in Missouri in December 2020, with initial
limited supplies directed to major hospital systems for distribution. The state’s vaccine allocation plans, which were
reportedly based on regional population numbers, left the
Greater St. Louis area with less supply than expected.28

Rural areas of the state received proportionally
larger vaccine shipments, resulting in surpluses that
drew some people from the St. Louis area.29 Vaccine
“deserts” emerged in northern St. Louis neighborhoods, where most residents are Black and many have
underlying health conditions.30
As the state made vaccines more widely available and
vaccination sites increased, COVID-19 case numbers
began decreasing in the spring of 2021. Just as LPHAs
were beginning to breathe a sigh of relief, the delta
variant of COVID-19 was detected in rural Missouri, and
quickly made its way to St. Louis. Delta’s high transmission rate put unvaccinated people at particular risk.
Since our study ended, the St. Louis region continues
to fight the virus, including facing the emergence of
the omicron variant. The past two years have left many
in the public health field feeling defeated; however,
this study comes at an opportune time to address the
long-standing problems and weaknesses that were made
so apparent by COVID-19, and to learn from and invest
in the successes of the region’s pandemic response.

22 City of St. Louis Department of Health. Guidance for reentry to City of St. Louis school systems. (July 2020). https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/health/communicable-disease/covid-19/guidance/phase-one/return-to-school.cfm
23 St. Louis County. Return to school guidance. (2020, July 1). https://go.lindberghschools.ws/cms/lib/MO01920486/Centricity/Domain/4/St.%20Louis%20County%20Return%20to%20School%20Guidance.pdf
24 Martinez, M. (2020, November 13). ‘We are danger-close’: With St. Louis area hospitals near capacity, task force calls on statewide
measures to slow spread of virus. KSDK. https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/covid19-st-louis-task-force-update/63-c26d65cd-d3a5-4a4d-91e2-8b80ddbdb2b0
25 Martinez, M. (2020, November 17). St. Louis area sets record for hospitalizations, Missouri reports more than 5,000 new COVID-19
cases. KSDK. https://www.ksdk.com/article/news/health/coronavirus/coronavirus-numbers/missouri-st-louis-covid19/63de1197eb-437f-4b72-ab4a-ab8fc49c7ba8
26 City of St. Louis Health Commissioner’s Order No. 15. (2020, November 12). https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/health/communicable-disease/covid-19/orders/health-commissioner-order-15.cfm
27 City of Jefferson County Executive Order No. 20-109. (2020, November 25). https://www.jeffcomo.org/DocumentCenter/
View/10927/20-109-Mask-Order?bidId=
28 Munz, M. (2021, February 10). State’s vaccine distribution shortchanges St. Louis region, local officials insist. St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/coronavirus/state-s-vaccine-distribution-shortchanges-st-louis-region-local-officials-insist/article_3b2b5859-8ef2-5518-8e61-4e59ab84a4f4.html
29 Gray, B. & Merrilees, A. (2021, March 7). Rural vaccine surpluses around Missouri spark frustration and questions. St. Louis
Post-Dispatch. https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/coronavirus/rural-vaccine-surpluses-around-missouri-spark-frustration-and-questions/article_96c76d86-ccfc-53b9-898a-5ceba944749a.html
30 Weinberg, T. (2021, February 4). Missouri data shows expanding ‘vaccine deserts’ in St. Louis and Kansas City metros. Missouri
Independent. https://missouriindependent.com/2021/02/04/missouri-data-shows-expanding-vaccine-deserts-in-st-louis-and-kansas-city-metros/
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I. Public Health Infrastructure
in the St. Louis Region of
Missouri
A Highly Populated Urban Hub
Missouri’s public health system represents a decentralized approach that relies on local decision-making.
In this report, we focus on four LPHAs in the Greater
St. Louis region: those in the City of St. Louis, Jefferson
County, St. Charles County, and St. Louis County. These
four areas are situated in Region C of the DHSS health
reporting regions (see Figure 2).31 Together, these four
LPHAs provide public health services for one-third of
Missouri’s population.
St. Louis County has one of the highest national rates of
workers commuting from outside the County; in 2013,
more than 70,000 St. Charles County residents, 45,000
Jefferson County residents, and 53,000 City dwellers
worked in St. Louis County, and nearly 140,000 residents
in St. Louis County worked in these other jurisdictions.32
Additional movement across the region is associated
with business activity that caters to residents metro-wide.
The region is home to some of the state’s largest employers including BJC Healthcare, SSM Health, Boeing
International Defense Systems, Walmart stores, Scott
Air Force Base, and Washington University in St. Louis.33

Large, sophisticated hospital systems, research centers,
and universities make it a hub for health care with a wide
bench of scientific and technical expertise.
As a whole, the St. Louis region is more racially diverse
than the rest of the state, though population characteristics vary substantially across the four jurisdictions.
Jefferson County is the least diverse among the four
areas, with about 94% of residents identifying as White
and 6% identifying as racial and ethnic minorities. In St.
Charles County, racial and ethnic minorities make up
about 13% of residents, while White people account
for 87% (see Appendix A, Table C).
St. Louis City is the most diverse. Black people account
for 46.4% of the population, White people make up
43.6% of City residents, and American Indian/Alaskan Natives, Asian or Pacific Islanders and multi-racial
groups make up about 7% of the population. About
3% of City residents identify as Hispanic/Latino (see
Appendix A, Table C). The Black population represents
about 25% of St. Louis County residents and White

31 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services divides its health reporting regions according to the Missouri State Highway
Patrol map. To view the regional map, see https://health.mo.gov/data/gis/pdf/map_ReportingRegions.pdf
32 United States Census Bureau. (2013, March 5). Census Bureau reports 236,000 workers commute into St. Louis County, MO., each
day. https://www.census.gov/newsroom/archives/2013-pr/cb13-r24.html
33 Missouri Economic Research and Information Center. Missouri’s top 50 employers. (2019). https://meric.mo.gov/industry-research/
top-50-employers
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FIGURE 2. MAP OF MISSOURI DHSS HEALTH REPORTING REGIONS: ST. LOUIS MISSOURI (REGION C)
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residents constitute about two-thirds of people living
in the County (see Appendix A, Table C).
Discriminatory policies in St. Louis, particularly certain
historic policies related to housing, have created highly
segregated neighborhoods.34 Most residents in the
northern neighborhoods of St. Louis City are Black or
other racial/ethnic minorities, whereas most residents
in the city’s southern neighborhoods extending into

St. Louis County are White.35,36 This racial segregation
is known locally as “the Delmar Divide,” in reference
to Delmar Avenue, where the racial characteristics of
residents north and south of the street differ substantially. According to a 2015 demographic analysis of St.
Louis, 97% of residents who live “north of Delmar” are
non-White versus 38% “south of Delmar.” Household
income and median property values are substantially
lower in North City.37

34 The City of St. Louis. Residential Segregation: The percentage of residents that live in racially segregated census tracts in the City
of St. Louis. https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/mayor/initiatives/resilience/equity/justice/civic-engagement/
residential-segregation.cfm
35 For the sake of all: A report on the health and well-being of African Americans in St. Louis and why it matters for everyone.
Washington University in St. Louis and Saint Louis University. (2015). https://cpb-us-w2.wpmucdn.com/sites.wustl.edu/dist/3/1454/
files/2018/06/FSOA_report_2-17zd1xm.pdf
36 Cambria N, Fehler P, Purnell JQ, Schmidt B. Segregation in St. Louis: dismantling the divide. St Louis, MO: Washington University
in St. Louis. (2018). https://healthequityworks.wustl.edu/items/segregation-in-st-louis-dismantling-the-divide
37 Tighe, JR, Ganning, JP. (2015). The divergent city: unequal and uneven development in St. Louis. Urban Geographic, 36:5, 654673. DOI:10.1080/02723638.2015.1014673
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Poverty is a critical issue in the St. Louis region where
there are vast disparities in household income, wealth,
and other economic factors. St. Charles County has
the lowest poverty rate (4.6%) and, along with St. Louis
County, is ranked among the wealthiest Missouri counties
in terms of median family income.38 The highest rates of
poverty in the region are in St. Louis City, where 21.8%
of households are classified as living in poverty. This rate
is nearly twice the state average of 12.9%. The St. Louis
Federal Reserve Bank found that “historical barriers”
like redlining and housing discrimination continue to
limit Black and Hispanic people’s ability to accumulate
wealth.39 Black residents in St. Louis were three times
more likely to live in areas where over 40% of people
live in poverty.40 LPHAs work to mitigate poverty’s health
impacts through a variety of programs related to healthy
food and nutrition, chronic disease management, maternal and child health, injury prevention, opioid and other
substance use interventions, and many other initiatives.

and achieving accreditation. Jefferson County’s LPHA
is accredited by the Missouri Institute for Community
Health (MICH), the accrediting body for Missouri’s Voluntary Accreditation Program for LPHAs (see Appendix
A, Table C).42

LPHA Accreditation, Governance,
and Financing

Missouri’s decentralized approach allows for variations
in governance structures that have implications for
public health decision-making and financing.43 Jefferson County’s public health department is governed by
an elected Board of Health that acts separately from
the county government to set public health priorities,
orders, and regulations.44 The St. Charles County and
the St. Louis County departments of public health are
parts of county government and consequently report to
their county executives, whose decisions may require
review or approval by county councils. The public health
department in St. Louis City is also part of local government, with the city LPHA reporting to the mayor and a
Board of Aldermen serving as the city’s legislative body. A
joint Board of Health and Hospitals serves in an advisory
capacity to the St. Louis City health director in matters
related to public health.45

The St. Louis City and County Public Health Departments
are two of only seven LPHAs in Missouri that are accredited by the Public Health Accreditation Board (PHAB),
a national voluntary organization that sets standards
for tribal, state, local and territorial public health agencies.41 LPHAs often cite cost and the demands on their
already limited resources as major barriers to seeking

The St. Louis region’s LPHAs have experienced chronic
underfunding and under-resourcing, which affect their
capacity to serve their communities, despite relatively
large budgets compared to less-populated regions
in the state. Mirroring the wealth divide between St.
Louis City and other more resourced communities in
the region, the City of St. Louis’s health department has

38 Data USA. St. Charles County, MO. (2020). https://datausa.io/profile/geo/st-charles-county-mo#economy
39 Hernandez Kent, A. & Ricketts, L. (2021, January 5). Wealth gaps between White, Black and Hispanic families in 2019. The Federal
Reserve Bank of St. Louis. https://www.stlouisfed.org/on-the-economy/2021/january/wealth-gaps-white-black-hispanic-families-2019
40 The City of St. Louis. Concentrated poverty. https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/mayor/initiatives/resilience/
equity/opportunity/neighborhoods/concentrated-poverty.cfm
41 Public Health Accreditation Board. Why become accredited? https://phaboard.org/why-become-accredited/
42 Missouri Institute for Community Health. Accreditation introduction. https://michweb.org/accreditation-introduction/
43 Decentralized local public health governance indicates that local government employees lead local health departments and local
governments have autonomy over fiscal decisions. See, https://www.astho.org/Research/Data-and-Analysis/State-and-Local-Governance-Classification-Tree/.
44 Jefferson County, Missouri. Home rule charter of Jefferson County, Missouri. https://ecode360.com/27895367
45 The City of St. Louis. Joint boards of health and hospitals. https://www.stlouis-mo.gov/government/departments/health/board/
index.cfm
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been particularly affected by budget cuts and lack of
investment over the past decades.46
Core support from the state for LPHAs in the St. Louis
region is negligible. Excluding pass through federal
dollars to run public health programs for chronic disease,
maternal and child health, and injury prevention, state
support ranged from 1.8% in St. Louis County to 8.5%
in St. Charles County.47 For all four LPHAs, local taxes
represented over half of their total revenue (pre-COVID).
During the pandemic, the four LPHAs in the region relied
on external funding to meet their needs. CARES Act
funds were distributed to counties in May 2020.48 The
City of St. Louis, Jefferson County, St. Charles County,
and St. Louis County all received CARES Act funding,
which was used to increase staffing and, in some cases,
to purchase contracted services. Even with substantial
CARES Act relief, LPHAs were stretched thin and struggled to maintain their traditional public health services.

46 Missouri Budget Project. The health of Missouri is at stake. (2016, January 16).
https://www.mobudget.org/the-health-of-missouri-is-at-stake/
47 In The City of St. Louis and Jefferson County, state support for LPHA programs was 2.8% and 5.7%, respectively.
For more information on LPHA revenue sources, see https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/review18/Table_Contents.php.
48 Missouri State Treasurer. Treasurer Fitzpatrick announces first CARES Act payments to local governments processed.
(2020, May 4). https://treasurer.mo.gov/newsroom/news-and-events-item?pr=d1bd7058-eca5-40b3-af74-cae92d8d0da8
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II. Strengths and Challenges in the
St. Louis Region of Missouri’s Public
Health Response to COVID-19
The following sections present key findings related to strengths and challenges experienced
by professionals from multiple sectors involved in the pandemic response, as well as
residents’ perceptions of the pandemic response.

A. Years of Emergency Response and
Preparedness Experience Were an Asset
in the Early Phase of the Pandemic
I think this emergency opened up a lot of weaknesses in [emergency preparedness]
... there were a lot of plans that the department wasn’t remotely prepared to implement.
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

When COVID-19 descended on the greater St. Louis area
in March 2020, the region was relatively well prepared. A
stakeholder in the education sector recalled, “There’s a vivid
memory of going, ‘Oh my gosh, we’ve got to pull out that
pandemic plan’ because I know it was in the file drawer.”
LPHAs in the region had begun preparing weeks before
the virus reached Missouri. In mid-January 2020, the St.
Louis City public health department met with the fire
department, Emergency Medical Services, City Emergency Management Agency, state emergency personnel,
and officials at Lambert International Airport to discuss
how the pandemic would impact the city. As a local
public health stakeholder explained, those early meetings provided an opportunity to “identify any gaps in
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communication as well as protocols,” and to develop
accurate distribution lists to ensure that the appropriate
individuals at each agency would be notified about
potential cases of COVID-19 in a timely manner.
The Jefferson County Health Department’s emergency
response team also looked to other states to see how
they were handling their cases and worked with their
administration to “prepare those planned what-ifs.”
There was also careful coordination with department epidemiologists and communicable disease nurses to create
efficiencies in the early days of the pandemic. According
to one local public health stakeholder: “They’re doing
the [disease tracking] and watching for those illnesses
ahead of time and were able to help work with the
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hospital systems and the community to start putting
those prevention steps in place.”
When the virus finally reached the region, LPHAs were
equipped with emergency response plans, dedicated
staff, and community- and state-level networks. Several health departments utilized an Incident Command
System (ICS) and started cross-training staff to work as
emergency responders. Two of the four LPHA directors
in the region previously held positions as leaders of
emergency preparedness and response teams.
Health systems also identified staff with emergency-response expertise to establish hospital-based emergency
operations centers in the first few weeks of the pandemic.
According to a health care stakeholder, “Someone said,
‘We should get together and we should start to figure out
how we’re going to manage beds, how we’re going to
manage ventilators. Make sure we know what our capacity
is. Start talking with city and county and state government
officials or people like the Public Health Department to
begin to plan how we’re going to deal with this.’”
Some public health and health care stakeholders described
previous experience and training focused on natural disasters and public health crises, such as flu and Ebola, as
helpful when responding to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Personal protective equipment (PPE) and other supplies
had been stockpiled by at least one LPHA and one hospital
in the region during the H1N1 and Ebola responses. Other
health care organizations scrambled to find adequate
supplies of PPE, with one representative of a long-term
facility commenting: “PPE was extremely challenging. I
probably have lost years of my life, honestly, just [from]
worrying about PPE in the early days.”

“There’s a vivid memory of going,
‘Oh my gosh, we’ve got to pull
out that pandemic plan’ because
I know it was in the file drawer.”
– Local education stakeholder

than a plan appropriate for the pandemic. At the state
level, emergency planning had long prioritized natural
disasters over infectious disease outbreaks, hampering
the speed with which officials could respond to the
unfolding pandemic. One public health stakeholder
highlighted these shortcomings for the current situation: “The thing that we’ve been doing the most with
the state has been preparing for the earthquake on the
New Madrid Fault … And our level of preparedness for
that [was] very different than what our preparedness
for a pandemic looked like.” Despite all their planning,
some LPHAs felt ill-equipped to put these emergency
plans into action.

Limitations of Emergency
Preparedness and Planning

On the whole, stakeholders from public health, health
care, and the education sector did not feel that the
region was prepared for the pandemic and pointed
to a lack of coordinated leadership from the state as a
major hindrance in the response. The State Emergency
Management Agency, Community Organizations Active
in Disaster, and Volunteer Organizations Active in Disaster
were decentralized in their response to the pandemic,
and were seen as being limited by an informal and
ineffective structure during the pandemic.

Stakeholders said that, even with years of expertise and
careful planning, the four LPHAs found their emergency
preparedness capacity to be insufficient to address
the magnitude of the pandemic. One public health
stakeholder reported that while their public health
department had plenty of “excellent and technically
correct preparedness plans,” staff had more experience
activating natural disaster or bioterrorism plans, rather

Although focus group participants were generally appreciative of public health and health care leaders’ efforts,
some were surprised at how unprepared and disorganized the region was to deal with the pandemic. As one
resident stated, “I know that no one predicted this and
know it was a damage-control-type thing. I wouldn’t even
expect anybody to be proactive with being able to prepare for this, but I just think it was just poorly executed.
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B. LPHA Staffing and Resource Constraints
Profoundly Limited the Response

We’re all operating with 200 people less than what we really need
to do the job well, and no resources to do it. That’s a lot of what we
struggle with.
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

The St. Louis region’s response benefited from having
experienced staff and leadership at the helm of LPHAs.
Together, each of the four LPHA directors had decades
of practice in relatively large, “full-service” public health
settings. One stakeholder commented, “We were really
fortunate that we actually had some top-tier, highly
informed leaders in [local] public health.”
Despite expert leadership and staff, however, the public
health departments in the St. Louis region were not
equipped with sufficient resources or capacity. Some
LPHAs were understaffed going into the pandemic and
most said that they did not have modernized technology
to manage immense disease tracking efforts. Stakeholders from public health, health care, the business
community, nonprofit organizations, and education
broadly agreed that longstanding underinvestment in
public health infrastructure hamstrung LPHAs’ ability
to respond.
In March and April 2020, prior to the distribution
of federal funding, LPHAs quickly reassigned staff
to the pandemic response, in some cases shutting
down all other services aside from the most-basic
necessities. One local public health stakeholder
lamented, “[Local elected officials] handicapped us,
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because we didn’t have the resources to do the essential
public health functions and now we’re in the middle
of a pandemic and we have to not only reallocate our
internal resources, but also figure out how to navigate
this pandemic.”
CARES Act funding provided a huge financial boost to
all four of the region’s LPHA budgets and enabled the
hiring of staff for pandemic response efforts. The four
LPHAs in the St. Louis region, unlike smaller departments
throughout the state, were well versed in how to manage
multiple funding streams, and eventually were able to
take advantage of opportunities to supplement their
revenues. However, as one public health stakeholder
put it, “by the time we had some CARES Act funding,
the [pandemic] was full blown and had bypassed the
benefit of contact tracing.” Furthermore, for each of the
LPHAs, new staffing was part of an emergency response
to COVID-19 rather than an opportunity to modernize
public health interventions or to shore up pre-existing
deficiencies in infrastructure.
LPHAs had trouble keeping up with the needs of their
communities at different stages of the pandemic. Public
health departments lacked adequate data tracking
systems and, as the volume of cases rose, existing
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tracking systems and personnel assigned to contact
tracing became overwhelmed. A public health stakeholder described how their public health department
just “couldn’t do [contact tracing]” prior to receiving
CARES Act funding. Another public health stakeholder
described turning their agency “upside down,” assigning
almost every full-time staff member to contact tracing,
and having to “shut down all services aside from very
basic necessities.” Summarizing the impact of LPHAs
inability to contact trace, another public health stakeholder explained: “If you can’t keep up with the case
investigations, you can’t identify the contacts. So you
can’t get in front of the contacts and quarantine them
before [they] infect other people.”

“By the time we had some
CARES Act funding,the [pandemic]
was full blown and had bypassed
the benefit of contact tracing.”
– Public health stakeholder

The impact of resource constraints on the provision
of essential pandemic services was felt by a number
of residents in the focus groups, who reported that
capacity and staffing issues impeded consistent testing
and the initial vaccine distribution. In St. Louis County,
for example, several residents noted that the public
health department had to rely on volunteers to help
with staffing shortages. As one participant said, “I think
just at the beginning with the contact tracing, they
just didn’t have enough people helping out. That was
a big deal … And then they looked for volunteers to
help run mass-vaccine events … So I think it was just
not knowing how many hands on deck you needed
to execute a lot of this stuff.” Due to these resource
constraints, residents noted other sectors, primarily
health care organizations, stepped in to fill the gap
left by public health.
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C. Community Partnerships Enhanced the Pandemic Response,
But Revealed Substantial Limits in Public Health Capacity
I was shocked at the level of collaboration we got, honestly, in the
[St. Louis] metro region.
— STAKEHOLDER IN NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATION

The St. Louis region saw unprecedented collaboration
during the pandemic. Before the pandemic, LPHAs
operated in ways that were “pretty siloed,” according
to several stakeholders, many of whom described a
“fragmented” metropolitan area where political disagreements have consequences for public health department
collaboration.49 Cross-sector collaboration pre-pandemic
was limited, with one federally qualified health center
(FQHC) stakeholder saying, “Very rarely did we have
much interaction with the city or the county department
of health prior to COVID.” Another stakeholder added
that coordination and collaboration across community organizations and social service providers “doesn’t
always happen in the St. Louis region.” While many
opportunities for collaboration existed before the pandemic, discussions did not always result in action. In
the words of one stakeholder: “So, yes, St. Louis, we
do collaborate. We all sit in meetings together, and we
just talk. Then when it comes down to getting stuff done,
it’s really hard to get us to work together.”
Improvements in collaboration during COVID-19 were
noted by many stakeholders, with one health care stakeholder stating: “I’ve seen [the public health departments]

be a lot more open to figuring out how to work creatively
with organizations as a result of COVID, more transparent
about what their challenges are, more willing to work
together.” Health systems that had long operated in a
highly competitive environment forged stronger ties,
with one stakeholder reporting that “the level of collaboration among the major [four] health systems was
really impressive.”

Hospital Systems and Health Centers
Assume a Major Role
In early April 2020, the four largest health systems — BJC
Healthcare, Mercy, SSM Health, and St. Luke’s Hospital — created the St. Louis Metropolitan Pandemic Task
Force (“the Task Force”) to “ensure collaboration and
the best possible patient care and coordination of supplies, hospital beds and other critical assets.”50 Public
health departments, business partners, local elected
officials, and infectious disease and data experts from
Saint Louis University and Washington University in St.
Louis were involved in many Task Force activities. The
incident commander of the Task Force, Dr. Alex Garza,

49 Better Together, formed in 2013, was an initiative to merge the City of St. Louis and St. Louis County health departments and
other public services, and eliminate the region’s fragmentation. To read the Task Force Report, see https://www.claytonmo.gov/
home/showdocument?id=4665. To learn more about Better Together, visit bettertogetherstl.com.
50 St. Luke’s Hospital. St. Louis regional healthcare systems launch St. Louis Metropolitan Pandemic Task Force. (April 2020). https://www.
stlukes-stl.com/St-Lukes-News/2020/St-Louis-Regional-Healthcare-Systems-Launch-St-Louis-Metropolitan-Pandemic-Task-Force/
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was SSM Health’s chief medical officer and a former
U.S. Department of Homeland Security official who led
the U.S. response to the H1N1 pandemic.51 Nearly all
stakeholders mentioned that the Task Force allowed
regional leaders to “speak with one voice” and provide
guidance to residents.
FQHCs in St. Louis City, St. Charles County, and Jefferson County were instrumental in providing testing
services, prioritizing financially stressed communities
and neighborhoods with large Black, Latino, and immigrant populations. FQHCs became part of the Task
Force as data revealed the disproportionate impact
COVID-19 was having on communities of color in the
region. Much of the coordination between the FQHCs,
the Task Force, and LPHAs was facilitated by the St.
Louis Integrated Health Network, a cross-organizational intermediary that aims to improve quality of
care and access for St. Louis residents, especially the
medically underserved.52
Stakeholders across all sectors as well as focus group
participants praised the work of the Task Force, whose
fast-acting response was considered critical to preventing even larger numbers of deaths and illnesses. In the
words of one resident, “I think one of the best things
that’s happened during the pandemic for health care
and public health is that there’s a St. Louis Metropolitan Pandemic Task Force, and health care systems
across St. Louis City, St. Louis County, St. Charles County,
Jefferson County, have tried to come together to have
one message. That message has been fact-based about
the vaccine, about [COVID-19].”
Several residents said they valued the evidence-based
approach of the Task Force and felt it stayed above the
political fray, making its recommendations and decisions more credible. As one resident explained, “I think
people are more likely to trust a health director than

“I’ve seen [the public health
departments] be a lot more open
to figuring out how to work
creatively with organizations as a
result of COVID, more transparent
about what their challenges are,
more willing to work together.”
– Local health care stakeholder

an elected official because you take the politics out of
it … And when you’re going straight to the source, it’s
the health director. That’s the one that’s the expert on
this.” Some stakeholders, however, felt that the apolitical posture of the Task Force meant that LPHAs were
left on their own to push for difficult policy decisions,
such as mask mandates. As a result, LPHAs and elected
officials were often in politically fraught positions related
to mitigation efforts.
In spite of its important role in leading the response,
many stakeholders pointed out shortcomings with the
Task Force, including the need for its leadership to be
more diverse. Several stakeholders questioned why the
Task Force had not been embedded in the Regional
Health Commission,53 which had served as a collaborative table with broad representation for nearly two
decades. A stakeholder in a community-based organization explained: “A lot of what was missing is probably
just having the leaders at the table that have experience
working with Black and Brown communities as well as

51 Langston, MC. Army Reserve medical officer leads St. Louis Metropolitan Pandemic Task Force. (2020, May 1). https://www.usar.
army.mil/News/Article/2173045/army-reserve-medical-officer-leads-st-louis-metropolitan-pandemic-task-force/
52 The St. Louis Integrated Health Network, made up of health centers, medical schools, health departments, and large hospital systems, aims to eliminate health care disparities through collaborative partnerships that develop solutions to improve accessibility,
affordability, and quality of care for vulnerable populations in the region. To learn more, visit https://stlouisihn.org/about/.
53 The St. Louis Regional Health Commission is a collaborative effort between the City of St. Louis, St. Louis County, the state of
Missouri, and health care providers, and community members to improve the health of St. Louis’s residents, insured and uninsured alike. To learn more, visit https://www.stlrhc.org/.
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data that shows some of the disparities.” Some stakeholders also pointed to the limitations of a hospital-led
Task Force, especially given that other health care and
community-based organizations have more direct links
with certain communities. For example, stakeholders
observed that the Task Force did not prioritize access
to testing and vaccination beyond the hospital setting,
and according to one public health stakeholder, the
focus was on sharing hospital-based data: “That was a
lost opportunity to really talk about some of the larger
issues with [COVID-19] … and to incorporate community-based data along with that hospital data.”

Focus on Social Services
The pandemic highlighted structural inequities in the
Greater St. Louis region and exacerbated the social and
economic needs of under-resourced communities. Two
new community partnerships were created in the early
weeks of the pandemic to address these needs.
The Regional Response Team (RRT) provided a centralized social services emergency response to help people
whose lives were most severely disrupted by COVID19. Operating in St. Louis City and County, St. Charles
County, and two neighboring counties in Illinois, the RRT
collaborated with social service providers, philanthropic
agencies, and others in private and public sector groups
to develop a targeted, real-time response to community
needs. Among its priorities were helping families feed
their children, leveraging support for rent and mortgage
assistance to prevent evictions, and working with the St.
Louis City and County public health departments and
others to distribute PPE in the community.
Many stakeholders held up the RRT as an example of
a partnership “born out of necessity” that created a
mechanism to coordinate and collaborate with non-profit
organizations and service providers, as well as LPHAs,
on behalf of vulnerable residents, which “doesn’t always
happen in the St. Louis region.” A stakeholder in a
community-based organization noted that the RRT “was
very much attuned to the disproportionate impacts on
the Black community and figuring out ways to address
that.” Some stakeholders in the non-profit sector, however, were unclear about the long-term role of the RRT
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and how its work was differentiated from social service
agencies operating in the RRT’s service areas.
Another partnership created early in the pandemic,
PrepareSTL, sought to create a trusted source of information for people at high risk of COVID-19, many of
whom were apprehensive of mainstream communications
channels when it came to the health of their families
and communities. Some of PrepareSTL’s early outreach
focused on face masks, proper hygiene, social distancing,
and other information, occasionally working with the
public health departments to co-brand communications or collaborate on strategies for equitable vaccine
distribution. In summer 2020, during the outpouring of
grief over the murder of George Floyd, PrepareSTL’s
messaging expanded to address the consequences of
battling a dual pandemic of racism and COVID-19.
The disparate impact of the pandemic on the region’s
most vulnerable populations was a critical concern
identified by many in the focus groups. In all four
focus groups with Black residents, participants talked
about the disproportionate risk of the virus in their
communities and the need for more and better services to address the devastating social and economic
impacts. For example, one participant pointed out
that Black residents with low incomes were especially
vulnerable: “I saw COVID just wreak havoc on every
social determinant of health from housing number
one to employment. I mean, literally everything like
transportation, food, everything I felt like was affected
by COVID. And even more specifically to Black and
Brown people, especially in areas that are low-income
because they don’t have resources … We will see the
effects of this for years and years to come, especially
with the Black and Brown populations.”

The Role of LPHAs in the Midst of
Multiple Regional Partnerships
Overall, the St. Louis region was awash in cross-sector
partnerships, which stakeholders considered a strength
to supplement limited public health resources throughout the pandemic. In the words of one community
stakeholder, “Our health departments were not necessarily positioned as the lead groups. We really went to
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“To be honest, it’s the public health
departments that seem to be the
most strained and have the least
collaborative capacity, especially
because they’re invited to show up
at so many tables, but I don’t see
a table that’s oriented to them.
I think that’s been something that
has gotten in our way quite a bit
over the last year.”

nurses, and other staff for early vaccination. According
to one education stakeholder, “I was able to get our
school nurses vaccinated, but it took, oh my gosh, so
much work and so much anxiety … Our health department was totally unhelpful.”
Participating in multiple partnerships presented practical
challenges for LPHAs, given their staffing limitations
and obligations related to public health service to their
communities. One stakeholder from the education sector
explained: “To be honest, it’s the public health departments that seem to be the most strained and have the
least collaborative capacity, especially because they’re
invited to show up at so many tables, but I don’t see a
table that’s oriented to them. I think that’s been something
that has gotten in our way quite a bit over the last year.”

– Local education stakeholder

people who had resources.” Many residents saw local
elected officials and the Task Force as the principal
leaders in the pandemic response in charge of developing policy and guidance, respectively, and viewed
public health agencies as serving in a supporting role.
In fact, very few participants (15%) could identify their
LPHA director by name, while many in the groups were
able to identify their county executive and Dr. Garza
as the Task Force lead.
Some residents praised LPHAs’ connections with the
community and their ability to leverage partnerships
with community organizations to help provide essential pandemic services. As one participant described,
“[The public health department] partnered with community partners, whether it’s qualified health centers or
churches. They’ve partnered with them to make [vaccines] easily available … [and with] school districts, to get
it to kids 12 and up who can get it. Yeah, they’ve really
used community partners to get to those people … so
I think that’s a big part of it.” A few school representatives, however, found LPHAs to be difficult to work
with, especially across jurisdictions. Some of the schools’
frustrations stemmed from communications lags as well
as the state’s decision not to prioritize teachers, school
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D. Poor Coordination Between the State and
Local Levels Weakened the Region’s Response

We ended up with such a patchwork of responses that it didn’t make
sense. It wasn’t a cohesive plan in the state. This county did one thing,
that county did another, and that made it hard too, because the residents of those two counties were complaining that the other county
did it differently.
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

The state’s home-rule approach to pandemic policy and
the decentralized nature of public health drove a locally
tailored response that was challenged by the scope,
scale and novelty of the pandemic. The state strategy
led to poor coordination across jurisdictions and school
districts, as well as disagreement over which entity had
the final authority to make and enforce pandemic policy.
Policies around school reopening, quarantines, business
closures, and masking were highlighted by stakeholders and residents as strategies that varied from county
to county, which added to the overall confusion and a
patchwork response. This tension came into particular
relief in St. Louis County and City, when restrictions
imposed by LPHAs and local elected officials became
subject to state legal action.54
Several stakeholders pointed to school policies around
quarantine and isolation as an example in which state
and local authorities were at odds around the best path

forward, particularly after Governor Parson loosened
quarantine restrictions in November 2020 in the midst
of a spike in cases. Some St. Louis area school districts
chose to defy the state guidance, noting publicly that
they did not agree with the state’s approach. As one
stakeholder in the education sector said, “The LPHAs
and the state are not on the same wavelength at all.”
The question of authority was also raised in a number
of the focus groups, where participants had mixed
reactions to the interplay between the state and local
levels. Many felt the governor should have initially
presented “a unified message from the top” that there
would be “no tolerance” for not complying with local
mandates. Others, however, felt the state’s lawsuits
and legislative actions helped stem concerns that local
officials were overreaching their authority and making
overly restrictive policies without going through the
appropriate decision-making channels.

54 In May and July of 2021, the Missouri Attorney General filed two separate suits against St. Louis County Executive Sam Page
and the St. Louis County Department of Public Health Director Dr. Faisal Khan in the first suit and Page, St. Louis Mayor Tishaura
Jones, and the city and county health departments in the second suit.
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Early collaborations across local jurisdictions became
frayed as pandemic policies diverged. Many stakeholders, especially those in health care, the education sector,
and public health, voiced concerns that the state’s local
control response did not make sense from an airborne
disease standpoint. In the words of one stakeholder,
“This virus doesn’t care about our political borders. It’s
going to move, and we should have had some consistency in what our response was as a state.” The lack of
consistent policy was also felt in the business community,
which needed to know “what you want me to do and
how long you want me to do it.”

The question of authority was also
raised in a number of the focus
groups, where participants had
mixed reactions to the interplay
between the state and local levels.

Many residents in the focus groups found the decentralized
approach imprudent given the area’s population density
and the frequent interchange of people across counties:
“We have a lot of people in a fairly small concentrated geographic area, but we have several different counties [and]
they all do their own thing … and it was extremely confusing
for people who don’t really know anything about viruses.”

up for the first phase of inoculations. As one public health
stakeholder explained, “Tomorrow I will get vaccine[s]. I
still don’t know how much vaccine I’m getting as the state
does not disclose that to me. I wait and see what shows
up … That makes it very hard to plan because they also
have this expectation that I administer that vaccine within
seven days. It takes hundreds of people to have one of
these mass vaccination clinics.”

Some stakeholders appreciated the nimbleness of a local
control approach and the flexibility it gave to leaders to
customize the pandemic response to community needs.
For example, a faith-based stakeholder considered
locally driven communications to be “more helpful,”
while a business stakeholder “enjoyed the freedom to
choose” practices that seemed to fit the circumstances
of their community.

Vaccine distribution
Stakeholders and focus group residents felt the lack of coordination between federal, state and local levels disrupted
the vaccine rollout. In the early phases of the rollout, the
state received incomplete information related to certain
federal distribution channels, including the timing and
amount of vaccine allocation to FQHCs and pharmacies.
At the same time, the state’s distribution plans for local
public health and health care organizations were unclear
to localities as they tried to anticipate demand and gear

Many stakeholders and residents described the inequities of rural areas getting a disproportionate share
of doses before the more populous St. Louis region.55
North St. Louis was considered by several stakeholders
to be a “vaccine desert.” The state’s decision to disseminate through hospitals first, instead of FQHCs and
community providers, complicated access for many of
the vulnerable populations living in underserved areas
without proximity to a hospital.56 Transportation issues
and the online vaccination registration system were also
cited by residents and stakeholders as barriers to access.
An overwhelming majority of Black focus group participants were frustrated with the vaccine distribution
process, suggesting that initial allocation of doses went
to areas in St. Louis County and the surrounding counties with higher proportions of White residents, which
delayed access for some of the most at-risk populations.
This misallocation made some feel like “the government
doesn’t care about a certain population.”

55 Munz, M. (2021, February 22). Tired of waiting: elderly, sick in St. Louis area drive hours to get vaccine. St. Louis Post-Dispatch.
https://www.stltoday.com/lifestyles/health-med-fit/coronavirus/tired-of-waiting-elderly-sick-in-st-louis-area-drive-hours-to-get-vaccine/article_87798811-0a92-5954-8309-ca71b4830645.html
56 Weinberg, T. (2021, February 9). St. Louis County sounds alarm at dwindling COVID vaccine supply, appointments may pause.
St. Louis Public Radio. https://news.stlpublicradio.org/health-science-environment/2021-02-09/st-louis-county-sounds-alarm-atdwindling-covid-vaccine-supply-appointments-may-pause
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E. Inconsistent Data Reporting and Outdated IT
Systems Stymied a Timely and Targeted Response

And because we didn’t have a great system in terms of communicable
disease data management to communicate back and forth quickly, that
meant everything was being done on paper and/or on systems that
were not capable of handling the capacity, the volume. So that was
challenging.
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

LPHAs in the St. Louis region are accustomed to
collecting and analyzing public health data. But during
the pandemic, local public health IT infrastructure and
capacity were not uniform or interoperable with other
sectors. In one example, an LPHA used an Excel form
as its case contact management system. Another public
health department sought the help of a volunteer to
build their case reporting and contact tracing databases
from the ground up using REDCap.57 Although health
care organizations tended to use more sophisticated
technology for their data collection and reporting, this
was not universal — for example, at least one long-term
care facility used Excel to track point-of-care testing.
The lack of a modern statewide reporting system and
of consistent methods for reporting created barriers for
early pandemic tracking efforts. A local public health

department staff member explained: “The state was
really slow to make some of those policies and make
some of the data and communications on how they
wanted investigations reported back up.” As a result,
information sharing was slow and case data reported
by the state did not always align with data reported at
the local level. One health care organization employee
called the state’s system “very antiquated” and reported
that people “lost confidence in the state’s numbers”
because of it.
Several focus group residents also noted that inconsistent
data from the state level caused them to question the
state’s ability to effectively manage the response: “Missouri’s tracker — it seems wrong. I know it was wrong.”
Other participants noted delays in reporting numbers
of cases, hospitalizations, and deaths, which further

57 REDCap is a web-based data collection software program that can be utilized to capture diverse types of data, including
COVID-19 case data. For more information, see: https://www.project-redcap.org/.
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undermined their trust in LPHAs. As a result, some participants looked elsewhere for information and found a
local Joplin resident, Matthew Holloway, to be a more
timely and reliable source.58 One focus group participant
reported, “He posts every day the data from across the
state because not all the data’s accurate or up-to-date.
So, he took that project on, and I follow him, and I trust
him as well.”
In order to improve tracking and increase the accuracy
of data, the state eventually implemented state-wide
reporting systems, including EpiTrax and MO ACTS.59
Local stakeholders, however, noted that the implementation of these systems came late in the response and
caused frustration as already overburdened LPHA staff
had to switch gears midstream: “everybody’s sort of built
their own [system] to start with and now they’re trying
to transition over into what the state’s trying to create.”
Notably, the ability of all four Greater St. Louis area public
health departments to collect data by race and ethnicity
(via ZIP code data) was instrumental in the identification
of disparities in health outcomes and access issues
related to the COVID-19 in the area. As early as April
2020, the region’s public health and health care organizations had indications that the virus was disproportionately
impacting communities with greater numbers of Black
residents, and worked with the Missouri Hospital Association to document these disparities.60 Further analysis
that used area hospitalization data uncovered inequitable
testing within these communities.61,62

While the state’s early data reporting system was not
sophisticated enough to provide such data at a granular
level, the state made efforts to facilitate access to local
data: “What the state did do is they allowed public health
departments to request data independently from different
health care providers and testing labs that were serving
the residents of their county. That provided a legal mechanism …to request COVID testing, hospital admission,
death, race, comorbidities, a lot of additional data from
health systems [themselves], which was more than what
they were getting from the state centralized database.”
However, some stakeholders felt that the collection and
use of data by race and ethnicity could have been more
consistent and better utilized for response purposes,
including to target vaccination outreach. As one community organization noted: “Nobody’s data system is
working to collect race data the appropriate way.”
During the vaccine rollout, LPHAs and health care organizations were tasked with identifying their own registration
solutions, which were not always the most efficient or
user friendly. One health care organization described
maintaining sign-ups through the platform they chose
as “a laborious, very manual process. I had one staff
that had to stay up overnight so that we didn’t get too
many people in certain slots.” By the time the state
implemented the Vaccine Navigator platform, many
LPHAs already had robust sign-up lists of their own, with
one LPHA noting they had as many as 100,000 on their
list before Vaccine Navigator was launched.

58 Holloway, M. Missouri COVID-19 update. (2020). https://theholloway.wixsite.com/mholloway-covid19
59 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. COVID-19 technology response system. (2020). https://health.mo.gov/living/
healthcondiseases/communicable/novel-coronavirus/technology.php
60 Reidhead, M., Johnson-Javois, B., Brown, A., Brinkmann, J., Joynt Maddox, K.E., McBride, T., Porth, L., Long, P., McDowell, V.,
Stoermer, A., Schmidt, S., Echols, F., Purnell, J., Ross, W. The disproportionate Impact of COVID-19 on Black and African American communities in the St. Louis Region. Available at https://bit.ly/COVID19_STL
61 Mody, A., Pfeifauf, K., Geng E. Using lorenz curves to measure racial inequities in COVID-19 testing. JAMA network open.
2021;4(1):e2032696-e2032696. doi:10.1001/jamanetworkopen.2020.32696
62 Mody, A., Pfeifauf K., Bradley, C., Fox, B., Hlatshwayo, M.G., Ross, W., Sanders-Thompson, V., Joynt Maddox, K., Reidhead, M.,
Schootman, M., Powderly, W.G., Geng, E.H. Understanding drivers of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) racial disparities: a
population-level analysis of COVID-19 testing among Black and White populations. Clinical Infectious Diseases, Volume 73,
Issue 9, 1 November 2021, Pages e2921–e2931.
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F. Trusted Information Sources Enhanced
Communication Efforts But Contended with
Misinformation and Inconsistent Messaging
What could we have done better? I don’t know. I feel like most things
boil down to communication.
— COMMUNITY ORGANIZATION STAKEHOLDER

Stakeholders across sectors said that clear communication with the public was a critical tool in the response.
Communication strategies took several forms and mediums. For example, local public health partnered with
community leaders and the Regional Health Commission to launch PrepareSTL. Commercials, social media
campaigns, and canvassing efforts were used to educate
the community on COVID-19 and how to connect with
social services.
Focus group participants were aware of many of these
communication strategies and discussed the importance
of press briefings, community outreach, and online strategies. A number of residents also pointed to the utility
of trusted social media platforms as a way to amplify the
public health messaging, including from public health
departments and the Task Force. Some described how
social media can be a powerful tool for conveying information and curating reliable sources geared to younger
people: “I think a lot of my friends … got their information
from articles shared on Twitter and Instagram, because
my demographic, the 20-somethings, don’t really watch
the news that often, so they’re always on their phones.”
Tailored and grassroots strategies were employed to
provide information to a variety of individuals and
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communities and efforts were made to provide complicated information — as one health care stakeholder
put it — in“readable plain language information to the
community.” For example, health care leaders provided
guidance to the community, including lengthy videos
encouraging vaccination. The City of St. Louis created
a FAQ page about the COVID-19 vaccine development;
St. Louis County held town halls about the vaccine; and
organizations partnered to provide vaccine awareness
and vaccine knowledge, particularly in North St. Louis.

Inconsistencies in Public Health
Messaging and Misinformation
Stakeholders across sectors felt that, in spite of their best
efforts, they contended with confusion and apprehension
due to evolving guidance related to the novel virus and
inconsistent messaging across counties and the state.
One community organization stakeholder noted: “The
guidance kept changing. That made people feel like they
didn’t trust it, even though that’s what it’s supposed to
do. It’s supposed to evolve as we learn more, but people
didn’t trust that.”
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Focus group residents echoed stakeholders’ frustrations and suggested that inconsistent communications
undermined the importance of public health messaging:
“I really think that probably the biggest failure of this
pandemic was there was not clear messaging from all
levels of government, and I think if we can have that
now, it will help convince a lot of … people.”
Most focus group participants said they also worried
about the influence misinformation might have had on
the public’s behaviors and how its spread undermined
evidence-based messaging. As one resident reported,
referring to public health guidance: “The people I’ve
talked to, they know what’s being said by the health care
community, they don’t agree, and they’re not willing
to do it.” A few residents highlighted the negative role
social media played in quickly spreading misinformation to large numbers of people and stoking negative
sentiment toward public health measures.
Misinformation was especially pervasive when it came
to the vaccine, and many focus group residents said
they thought better messaging around the development and safety of the vaccine, and an explanation of

“I really think that probably the
biggest failure of this pandemic
was there was not clear messaging
from all levels of government, and I
think if we can have that now, it will
help convince a lot of … people.”
– Focus group resident

the reason for their rapid emergency use authorization,
might help address some of the legitimate hesitancy
in their communities.63 Some focus group participants
expressed disappointment that decisionmakers in the
state did not try to dispel misinformation by more
emphatically encouraging people to get it. One participant recounted a local press conference that was
held when the vaccine became available: “I was very
surprised that the tone was … much more ‘It’s an important decision. We would never want to force someone
to do something to their own bodies,’ and to me, that
was a real missed opportunity … So, I think … those
elected leaders or leaders in government ought to
have said, ‘Yes, I got vaccinated. I trust this. I think
it’s the right step for our community’ — I think it’s an
important message and something that many people
would be persuaded by.”

Trust in Communication Sources
Using a trusted messenger to convey information was
recognized as an effective strategy in the St. Louis
area’s pandemic response, and was one that was frequently employed. For example, PrepareSTL looked
to individuals from the community to hold conversations with friends, family, and others about protecting
themselves from the virus. The Jefferson County Public
Health Department made sure to create education
campaigns in collaboration with community leaders to
ensure messaging was coming from multiple trusted
sources of information in the community.
Focus group residents also talked about sources of
information they relied on most to get updates on the
pandemic. Information coming from local officials and
medical professionals, such as Dr. Garza from the Task
Force, were highlighted by some residents as especially
helpful and trustworthy, particularly at the beginning
of the pandemic when many people relied on press
briefings for information. Poll data from residents who

63 The GW study’s findings are consistent with findings from work previously commissioned by the Missouri Foundation for Health,
investigating Missourians’ attitudes towards COVID-19, vaccines, and vaccine messaging. See: Perry Undem & Betty & Smith.
(February 2021). Insights from twelve focus groups: messaging to Missourians about the COVID-19 vaccine. https://mffh.org/
wp-content/uploads/2021/03/MFH-Vaccine-Presentation-FINAL.pdf.
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participated in focus groups showed that an overwhelming majority said they mostly or completely
trusted information coming from their LPHA (90%)
and local hospital and health care leaders like the Task
Force (94%).
Many health care and community-based organization
stakeholders, however, noted a need for direct interaction with the community in order to build trust. As
one community organization leader put it: “How do
you get masks, hand sanitizer, and accurate information
to people who we know won’t trust the usual media
outlets, won’t believe anybody else? ... They’ll believe
me when I come to their door and say to them, as part
of their community, ‘This is what’s happening, and this
is what you need to consider, and here in your hands
is what will help you through this.’”
The Task Force was not always viewed as the best
mechanism for community outreach, particularly with
vulnerable populations. One health center staff member

Poll data from residents who
participated in focus groups
showed that an overwhelming
majority said they mostly or
completely trusted information
coming from their LPHA (90%)
and local hospital and health care
leaders like the Task Force (94%).
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explained: “The population that we serve is not really
interested in the Pandemic Task Force. They will not
log in to hear Dr. Garza speak about the data and hospitalizations. That’s just not a concern for them.” Health
centers and community organizations located in these
communities were thought to be better positioned to
build trust, actively listen to community needs and
concerns, and offer information.
Many residents echoed these sentiments, using vaccine
messaging as an example. Several said hearing from
community doctors and nurses about the risks and
benefits of the vaccine was important because these
medical professionals had built up trust and rapport
with the community. A number of Black focus group
participants said they would appreciate messaging
that is inclusive of Black people and shows how the
vaccine is affecting people in their communities. One
participant described feeling reassured when they
realized “a Black lady basically was one of the main
people that was involved with putting [the research]
together. So that made me feel better.”
Other residents were confused by the different partnerships and spokespeople discussing the local impact of
the pandemic, at times questioning who they should
be following for the best, most up-to-date information
on the pandemic. Several who lived outside of St. Louis
City and St. Louis County also felt their local leaders did
not seem to have as strong a voice or media presence
as the Task Force. These focus group participants said
they turned to national sources of information instead
of local leaders: “There was a St. Louis pandemic group
with some doctor that was kind of covering the St. Louis
region, but as far as St. Charles County, there hasn’t
been anybody saying anything. So I mean, it’s basically
been following what the national news is saying as far
as where we are, the CDC.”
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G. Racial Inequities Were Not Effectively Anticipated
and Addressed by the Local and State Response, with
Tragic Consequences

‘Oh, we want data and we want equitable distribution of vaccines’…
Nobody’s worried about equitable distribution of really anything in St.
Louis, and now you want to do it for [vaccines]?
— HEALTH CARE STAKEHOLDER

COVID-19 exacerbated racial and ethnic inequities in a
way that was both predictable and regrettably familiar to
many in the region. Based on Missouri’s COVID-19 case
reporting, Hispanic/Latino people were more likely to
contract COVID-19 and Black people were more likely to
die from COVID-19 than White residents.64 Public health
equity was a major concern among stakeholders and
focus group participants in the region, and especially
among people in St. Louis City and County.

perpetuates the inequities that we have here in the City
of St. Louis.” According to several stakeholders, considerable expertise across sectors in St. Louis City and
County was not adequately leveraged to create equitable
action strategies. Some stakeholders mentioned that
while discussions around race and equity take place in
the St. Louis area, most organizations are still relatively
new to developing interventions to address inequities
in their own institutions.

Many stakeholders advocated for a better distribution
of resources based on data analysis showing racial and
ethnic disparities. One public health stakeholder was
especially frustrated by the distribution of COVID-19
funding: “After we documented that the more severe
cases of COVID were in this underserved area of North
St. Louis, the deaths were disproportionately in North
St. Louis, the Cares Act Funding went predominantly
to St. Louis County … So that’s alarming and that only

Black focus group residents recounted experiencing
racism and discrimination within the context of the
pandemic. Most Black participants in the focus groups
expressed frustration that leaders were not doing more to
address their unique needs. Some felt elected officials as
high up as the governor were ignoring them altogether,
while others felt leaders were simply paying lip service
to the concerns of Black and Brown communities. One
resident said, “I think the attitude overall has been to

64 The COVID Tracking Project. Missouri: all race and ethnicity data. (2021). https://covidtracking.com/data/state/missouri/race-ethnicity
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ignore [the disparity] and downplay it and certainly I don’t
think there’s been any particular focus on caring about
what disparate impacts the virus might have.” Another
participant suggested leaders were focusing on the concerns of White residents over those of Black residents,
“The people that were leading the charge were leading
in the wrong way … They were making it worse, trying
to cater to the White business owners.” Some residents
in the focus groups felt that the high cost and limited
availability of tests in predominantly Black and minority
neighborhoods suggested that those in charge “did not
care” about their communities.
A number of Black residents reported that community- and faith-based organizations were filling the void,
reaching out to the most vulnerable and needy residents
in the region, including Black, Brown, immigrant, and
non-English-speaking groups. Several participants said
these groups played an essential role in the pandemic
response because they were trusted organizations that
already regularly served these populations. These organizations have been especially helpful in encouraging
uptake of the vaccine among minority residents, some
of whom have been reluctant to get inoculated because
of mistrust in the government.

Language and Cultural Barriers
Throughout the state, the COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated language and cultural barriers that hindered
access to pandemic-related services for people with
limited English proficiency. In the St. Louis region,
LPHAs did not always have the resources to provide culturally and linguistically tailored information. Advocates
explained that immigrant communities experienced

trouble accessing the vaccine when information about
it was not available in multiple languages.65 One public
health stakeholder in St. Charles County noted the need
for mobile vaccination sites that target Hispanic/Latino
and non-English speaking groups to have appropriate,
accessible resources for people with limited English proficiency. They also cautioned not to tie these resources to
the National Guard or law enforcement because “those
that may not have a legal status in the country are afraid
to come to [mass vaccination events] because they know
that the National Guard is with us for some of our events.”
In response to disparities in vaccine uptake and health
outcomes among the Hispanic/Latino, immigrant, and
non-English speaking populations, community and volunteer-based organizations like STL Juntos worked to
provide more culturally tailored pandemic resources. STL
Juntos started its volunteer support services in response
to the pandemic, and has since been lauded for helping
lead the state in vaccination rates among the Hispanic
and Latino population.66,67

Throughout the state, the
COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated
language and cultural barriers
that hindered access to pandemicrelated services for people with
limited English proficiency.

65 Henderson, A. (2021, March 11). Language hinders St. Louis immigrants from registering for COVID-19 vaccine. St. Louis Public
Radio. https://news.stlpublicradio.org/coronavirus/2021-03-11/language-hinders-st-louis-immigrants-from-registering-for-covid19-vaccine
66 Hamdan, L. (2021, September 24). How STL Juntos helped Latinos lead Missouri in vaccinations. St. Louis Public Radio.
https://news.stlpublicradio.org/show/st-louis-on-the-air/2021-09-24/how-stl-juntos-helped-latinos-lead-missouri-in-vaccinations
67 Ndugga, N., Hill, L., Artiga, S., Haldar, S. Latest data on COVID-19 vaccinations by race/ethnicity. (2021, December). Kaiser Family
Foundation. https://www.kff.org/coronavirus-covid-19/issue-brief/latest-data-on-covid-19-vaccinations-by-race-ethnicity/

32

The Public Health Response to COVID-19 in the St. Louis Region of Missouri

H. The Public Health Response Did Not Sufficiently
Meet the Needs of People Living in Poverty
I think we underestimated the level of poverty … [the] impact of poverty, … having individuals
who are struggling on a day-to-day basis to provide food and to provide shelter for just
themselves and their families, but then also to have some businesses in poor neighborhoods inflating prices, or price gouging, and making it so that individuals can’t afford
a simple disposable face mask.
— LOCAL PUBLIC HEALTH STAKEHOLDER

As the St. Louis region experienced school and business
closures, unemployment rates tripled in all four areas
by May or June of 2020, compared to earlier in the
year, further straining communities.68 One focus group
resident working at a hospital said, “I just think it was
so overwhelming … dealing with living check [to] check,
and now on top of that, you got to worry about a virus …
I just think it just took a huge toll.” Stakeholders and focus
group residents highlighted challenges accessing food,
housing, and transportation, as well as income declines
with reduced or lost wages.
Transportation emerged as a significant access barrier to
social services and to testing and vaccines. Public transportation was not available in all neighborhoods; even
when it was available, it risked exposing people to the
virus and therefore served as a disincentive to mitigation
efforts. According to focus group participants, some local
food distribution sites were actively involved in addressing
food insecurity but were not always convenient to those in
need, requiring that some residents rely on public transit
and haul heavy boxes from the sites.
Barriers to access caused by a lack of technology were also
a source of concern. According to one stakeholder in a

community-based organization, “The issue with telehealth
was our patient population didn’t actually have internet
and phone service, so it became a different barrier and
[health care providers] had to figure out how to cover
those types of needs.” Residents indicated that relying
on the internet to disseminate public health messaging
and access public health services excluded vulnerable
communities, including those living in poverty, people
experiencing homelessness, and older adults. A resident
working in health care explained that health care organizations sometimes wrongly assume that people have internet
access, saying, “In a lot of our communities ... [people] are in
a poorer environment and they don’t have access to Wi-Fi.
They’ve been impacted tremendously by not being able
to schedule appointments to get a test, to get a vaccine.
A number of them had symptoms and weren’t able to get
tested, and ended up dying from the virus.”
Partnerships like the RRT mobilized efforts to provide
housing and social service supports, and local philanthropies restructured some of their grantmaking to address
exigencies created by the pandemic. Nevertheless, these
efforts sometimes fell short of meeting the substantial
need, and certainly were not targeted to addressing the
root causes of decades of poverty in the region.

68 Missouri Department of Labor & Industrial Relations. Unemployment benefits by county. (2021). https://laborwebapps.mo.gov/
ui_stats?s=1&county=107&month_year=All+Months%2FYears
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Key Recommendations:
Strengthening the Public
Health Response to COVID-19
and Future Crises in the St
Louis Region of Missouri
The infusion of new federal dollars into Missouri has the potential to
bring more money to the state’s public health infrastructure than ever
before. Our hope is that these findings will be leveraged for the purpose
of strengthening the public health system’s ability to continue to respond
to the COVID-19 pandemic and face future crises with greater resources
coordination, equitable strategies, modernized infrastructure, and public
trust. Specific recommendations for advancing this vision are detailed in
our report Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key Findings
and Recommendations for State Action and Investment.69

69 Levi, J., Regenstein, M., Hughes, D., Trott, J., Markus, A., Seyoum, S., Acosta, A.,
Benoit, M., Van Bronkhorst, H., Conway, C. “Missouri’s Public Health Response to
COVID-19: Key Findings and Recommendations for State Action and Investment”.
(September 2021). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. Paper 61.
https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/sphhs_policy_briefs/61

TABLE 1. MISSOURI’S PUBLIC HEALTH RESPONSE TO COVID-19: KEY RECOMMENDATIONS FOR
STRENGTHENING PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE IN MISSOURI

Recommendation

The State of Missouri Should:

1

Provide financial support
and technical assistance for
public health accreditation.

Create a special fund to provide technical assistance for LPHAs to assess
readiness for accreditation via the Public Health Accreditation Board,
identify costs to close gaps, and cover fees associated with the accreditation
application process.

2

Prioritize equity.

Expand funding, staff, and other support to help LPHAs integrate equity
principles into data collection and reporting and community engagement
(i.e., trust building, links to social services). Increase workforce and funding for the
Office of Minority Health.

3

Build a modernized
surveillance system.

Build a modernized system and provide LPHAs or regional bodies with hardware
and software to manage the system, consistent with federal standards.

4

Create regional
coordinating bodies.

Incentivize and support greater formal sharing of staffing and services
among smaller LPHAs, with a lead public health agency designated to
convene and coordinate, designed to develop and strengthen all foundational
public health capabilities.

5

Bolster the public health
workforce.

Support workforce development through equitable recruiting, hiring, and
promotion practices; new training programs; enhanced salaries for LPHA leaders
with advanced training; and by deploying skilled staff within regions.

6

Ensure equitable public
health funding across the
state.

Provide a minimum level of funding for LPHAs, linked to delivery of foundational
public health services and an equity analysis incorporating social vulnerability, and
ensure that public health money flows directly to LPHAs.

7

Clarify LPHA governance
structure and authorities.

Commission legal analysis to create greater consistency in decision making
and oversight across LPHA governance and financing.

8

Harmonize policy
development.

Ensure consistent policies across jurisdictions for public health prevention and
mitigation measures. DHSS should establish and adhere to protocols
for consultation with LPHAs on new policies during emergencies.

SOURCE: Levi, J., Regenstein, M., Hughes, D., Trott, J., Markus, A., Seyoum, S., Acosta, A., Benoit, M., Van Bronkhorst, H.,
Conway, C. “Missouri’s Public Health Response to COVID-19: Key Findings and Recommendations for State Action and
Investment”. (September 2021). Health Policy and Management Issue Briefs. Paper 61. https://hsrc.himmelfarb.gwu.edu/
sphhs_policy_briefs/61

Appendix A: Methods and Data Sources
Stakeholder Interviews
This project employed a mixed-methods, qualitative comparative case study approach to conduct an evaluation of
the public health response to COVID-19 in Missouri. The
findings in this report come principally from interviews
with stakeholders. A total of 131 stakeholders from state
and local public health departments, elected and other
government officials, health care organizations, educational institutions, the business community, faith-based
organizations, membership associations, and a variety
of social support services and other non-profits were
interviewed virtually from October 2020 to May 2021.
Forty stakeholders were interviewed in the St. Louis
region (Table A). Interviews were supplemented by media
accounts and other publicly available data sources, as well
as focus groups with 50 residents in Missouri (Table B).
A purposeful sample of stakeholders was recruited in
four areas in the St. Louis metropolitan area (City of
St. Louis, Jefferson County, St. Charles County, and St.
Louis County) (Table A) to reflect variation in experiences with public health practice, local governmental
processes and structures, and potential opportunities
for strengthening public health statewide. Participants
were recruited through snowball sampling, reviews of
media reports, and general research techniques. All
interviewees were promised confidentiality. Interview
questions came from guides developed by GW for
this study and customized to the sector represented
by the interviewee. In the vast majority of cases, each
interview consisted of one individual stakeholder and
two GW study members. Interviewees did not receive
compensation for their participation.

when interviewees did not consent to audio-recording.
All of the transcripts and notes were coded using the
Dedoose qualitative software platform and following
standard protocols for building a codebook and applying
the codes to transcripts. Each interview transcript was
coded by two or more GW study team members. Coded
interview excerpts were reviewed for common themes,
both within and across geographic regions. Themes were
identified based on a variety of rationales, including the
frequency with which they were mentioned in different
transcripts and regions, the emphasis with which they
were presented, and consensus amongst different GW
study team members.
The selection of regions for in-depth analysis was informed
by the Missouri State Emergency Management System
(SEMA) division of the state into nine distinct regions (A-I),
which are each affiliated with a Highway Patrol Troop.
Highway Region C consists of the four areas profiled
in this report, plus eight additional counties located in
the eastern central portion of Missouri (Figure 2).70 This
analysis focuses on the following four areas: City of St.
Louis, Jefferson County, St. Charles County, and St. Louis
County.71 These areas collectively represent approximately
85% of Region C’s population.
Quotes were selected from transcribed interviews in the
region and were condensed, abbreviated, or minorly
redacted to protect confidentiality and clarify phrases in
the event that the transcription service made errors or if the
interviewees repeated themselves or added filler words
(e.g., “um”) that distracted from their overall statements.

Interviews were audio-recorded with permission and then
transcribed. Alternatively, careful note-taking was used

70 In addition to the four areas profiled in this report, Region C includes Franklin County, Lincoln County, Perry County, Pike County,
St. Francois County, Ste. Genevieve County, Warren County, and Washington County.
71 Missouri Department of Public Safety SEMA. State regional coordinators program. https://sema.dps.mo.gov/programs/area_coordinator.php
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TABLE A. INTERVIEWEES IN ST. LOUIS MISSOURI (OCTOBER 2020 – MAY 2021)
Sector

Who is Included?

Number of Interviews

Business

Chamber of commerce, business councils, economic groups

3

Community/Faith
Organizations

Non-profits, for-profits, health networks, community
partnerships, social services, churches, faith-based social
service organizations

9

Education

K-12, higher education, and education-focused entities

5

Health Care

Hospitals and health centers, health care associations, longterm care facilities, and behavioral health

11

Policy

Government entities (city, county)

1

Public Health

Emergency management, LPHAs, research, and other public
health-focused organizations

11

Total

40

Focus Groups with Residents
We held 11 focus groups and four one-on-one interviews
with a total of 50 participants, all of whom resided in
the St. Louis region. We recruited participants through
community-based organizations and leaders, faith-based
institutions, local public health forums, such as COVID-19related Facebook groups, and other community coalitions.
We also used a qualitative market research firm to help
recruit Black participants.
Our focus group sample comprises self-selected participants, who take the pandemic very seriously. In line
with the convention of purposeful sampling in qualitative
evaluations, this sample provides us with an intentionally
well-informed group of participants, who have thoughtful and reasoned input on the public health response in
Missouri. While we appreciate participation from a more
representative population of residents would have given
us perspective on those with whom the public health
response struggles to engage, we believe our sample
provides a more useful and accurate assessment of how
the public health response unfolded, how it was interpreted by those who understood its importance, and how
the social and political context in the state impacted it.

We collected socio-demographic information from participants using a screening survey disseminated prior to
the focus groups. Participants also provided information
on COVID-19-related questions, including changes in
employment and housing as a result of the pandemic,
whether they worked in an essential job, whether they had
school-age children, whether they had tested positive for
COVID-19 and their vaccination status. During the focus
groups, we also collected information from participants
using Google polls. These polls focused on topics related
to the public health response and asked participants to:
reflect on specific guidelines, including those recommended by the CDC; identify sources of information they
use to get updates on the pandemic; and report their level
of confidence in local public health officials.
All focus groups were conducted via Zoom and participants were invited to contribute through oral discussion or
written comments using the chat function. Focus groups
were recorded and transcribed for accuracy. Study members analyzed transcripts and chat records using NVivo
software and examined key themes that emerged during
the discussions. Themes were identified based on the
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frequency and intensity with which participants discussed
an issue both across and within groups. Poll data were
also analyzed to triangulate themes that emerged in the
groups. Focus group participants received gift cards to
Amazon or local stores in appreciation of their time.

Socio-Demographics of Focus
Group Participants
We collected socio-demographic information from participants using a screening survey disseminated prior to
the focus groups. While the majority of participants in the
focus groups lived in St. Louis City and County, we also
had residents participate from Jefferson County and St.
Charles County. The vast majority (86%) of participants
were female and a majority (60%) were below the age

of 50. Less than half of the participants (40%) identified
as White, while a majority (60%) identified as Black.
Half of respondents (54%) had completed either some
college/two-year degree or four years of college, and
38% had earned a graduate degree. Most (66%) had a
household income of less than $99,000. Those participating in focus groups had a variety of employment
situations. Most (62%) reported they worked as paid
employees, and a small percentage (18%) said they
were retired. Another 20% reported not working at the
time of the focus group. Most participants lived in urban
communities, with the majority (58%) reporting they
lived in a city/metro area with a population of 250,000
people or more. More information about the St. Louis
focus group participants can be found in Table B.

TABLE B. ST. LOUIS FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS
Number of Respondents

50

Age

Respondents
(% of total)

Race/Ethnicity

Respondents
(% of total)

21-29

11 (22%)

White

20 (40%)

30-39

7 (14%)

Black

30 (60%)

40-49

12 (24%)

Other

0 (0%)

50-59

6 (12%)

Identify as Hispanic/Latino

60-69

10 (20%)

Respondents
(% of total)

70+

4 (8%)

N (%)

0 (0%)

Gender

Respondents
(% of total)

Language

Respondents
(% of total)

N (%) female

43 (86%)

Speaking a language other than
English at home, N (%)

2 (4%)
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TABLE B. ST. LOUIS FOCUS GROUP PARTICIPANT DEMOGRAPHICS (CONTINUED)
Number of Respondents

50

Highest Grade Level/
School

Respondents
(% of total)

Employment Status

Respondents
(% of total)

Some high school, but did not
graduate

0 (0%)

Working (as paid employee)

31 (62%)

Self-employed

0 (0%)

High school degree or GED

4 (8%)
Retired

9 (18%)

Some college or 2-year degree

14 (28%)
Not working*

10 (20%)

4-year college graduate

13 (26%)

Graduate school degree

19 (38%)

Urban-Rural Makeup

Other/prefer not to answer

0 (0%)

Respondents
(% of total)

Income

Respondents
(% of total)

City/Metro Area with a Population
of 250,000 or more people

39 (78%)

City/Metro Area with a Population
of 50,000 to 250,000 people

10 (20%)

City/Metro Area with a Population
of 20,000 to 49,000 people

0 (0%)

Less than $49,999

13 (26%)

Between $50,000-$99,999

20 (40%)

Between $100,000-$149,000

6 (12%)

Non-Metro Area
(population of ≤ 20,000)

0 (0%)

Above $150,000

6 (12%)

Other/prefer not to answer

1 (2%)

Other/prefer not to answer

5 (10%)

*Category includes those that are unemployed, students, and those with disabilities which prevent them from working
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TABLE C. PUBLIC HEALTH INFRASTRUCTURE AND DEMOGRAPHICS IN ST. LOUIS MISSOURI

County

Population72

Racial & Ethnic Composition73

Persons
living below LPHA
poverty (%)74 Governance75

Per Capita
Public
Health
Revenue76

City of
St. Louis+

301,578

White: 43.6%
Black: 46.4%
AI or AN: .3%
Asian or PI: 3.5%
Multiracial: 2.4%
Hispanic: 4.0%

21.8%

City Council
(Board of
Aldermen)

$70.83

Jefferson
County*

226,739

White: 94.1%
Black: 1.2%
AI or AN: .3%
Asian or PI: .8%
Multiracial: 1.6%
Hispanic: 2.1%

8.4%

Board of Trustees

$29.97

St. Charles
County

405,262

White: 86.6%
Black: 5.3%
AI or AN: .2%
Asian or PI: 2.9%
Multiracial: 2.1%
Hispanic: 3.4%

4.6%

County Council

$12.03

St. Louis
County+

1,004,125

White: 65.3%
Black: 25%
AI or AN: .2%
Asian or PI: 4.7%
Multiracial: 2.2%
Hispanic: 3%

9.3%

County Council

$54.96

*MICH Accreditation77, + PHAB Accreditation78

72 United States Census Bureau. Quick facts. (2020). https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
73 United States Census Bureau. Quick facts. (2020). https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
74 United States Census Bureau. Quick facts. (2020). https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045219
75 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Public health works: a web-based orientation manual for public health leaders.
(March 2019). https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/phworks/publichealthworks.pdf
76 Missouri Department of Health and Senior Services. Revenue sources for local public health agencies. (2018).
https://health.mo.gov/living/lpha/review18/Table_Contents.php
77 Missouri Institute for Community Health. Accredited agencies in missouri. https://michweb.org/accredited-agencies-in-missouri/
78 Public Health Accreditation Board. Complete list of nationally accredited health departments, Missouri. (2021, August 24).
https://phaboard.org/who-is-accredited/
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